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lN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DELBERT CHRIS CLARK 
Petfttoner-Appe11ant, 
va. 
JOHN w. TURNER, warden 
Utah State Prtson, 
Reapondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE Of CASE 
: 
• • 
Case No. 
: 
10684 
' 
i 
This js an appeal from a dental of a 
petition for writ of error, construed by 
the local court aa a wrtt of Habeas Corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A hearing waa held before the Honor-
able Marce11ua K. Snow, Judge, Salt Lake 
County, Utah, on June 22, 1966. The court 
2 
treated the petitioner's Writ of Error 
as a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
and denied the same. 
RELIEF ~OUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appe11•nt seeks reversal of the 
judgment of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant filed a petition for 
writ of Error alleging that on June 2, 
1961 he was convicted of second degree 
burglary and of the status of betng • 
habitual crtmtnal. The sentencing court 
sentenced the appellant uder the second 
degree burglary 1t1t~t• and t•posed • 
separate sentence under the habitual 
criminal statute which provides for a 
3 
term of not Jess than fifteen years. 
The appe11ant c1atms a vfo1ation of 
tho Oue Process and double Jeopardy. 
No evidence was presented et the 
hearing. However, ft was agreed thlt 
the petitioner wes sentenced to two 
separate sentences, one for second 
dewree burglary and habttua1 crtmtna1. 
(R-4) (R-8). These sentences were 1ater 
conm~ted to run concurrently. 
ARGUMENT #1 
THi S£HTENC1NG COURT YIOLATEO TH[ 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY RIGHTS SECURED UNDER THE 
FIFTH AMENDMENT IN IMPOSING TWO SEPARATE 
SENTENCES ON TH! PETITIONER FOR TH! THIRD 
SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE AND H49ITUAL CRIMINAL 
.iTATUS. 
lt ts respectfully aubmttted that the 
4 
sentencing COJrt violated the petittoner•1 
right secured under the double jeopardy 
clause of the ftfth Amendment, Untied 
States Constf tutton and Utah Constitution, 
Art. 1 sec:. 12, which prQhlblta any person 
from being twice put f n jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
The habf tua1 criminal statute ta 
set forth In UCA 76-1-18 as amended (1953) 
and 76-1-19 as amended (1953) ~ clearl1 
1et1 forth the procedure whereby one ts 
charged, tried, and sentenced •• having 
the status of a habitual criminal. The 
conduct of the trial on the third aub· 
stentive offense and on the Issue of 
being a habitual crtmtnal 1tatu1 ts cl .. rly 
set forth tn State vs. Stewart, 110 Utah 
203, 171 p2d 383 (1946) •nd State va. 
Leimer, JO Utah 2d 4S, J47 P2d 1111, 7~ 
5 
ALR2d 84 {1960). The statute ia, however, 
silent as to the precise 1118nnor in which 
the defendant show1d be sentenced, con-
sequent1 y we must look to motive and pur-
pose of the habitual criminal law for 
en 1 i ghtment • 
It is clear that the habitual crtm-
inal statute doea not Invoke a separate 
crime but rather a 1tatu1, to wit the 
1tatua of being a habitual criminal crtm-
inal. See 58 ALR 102, 82 ALR l]j, 116 
AL~ 236. Leitner va. Turner, 14 Utah 2d 
232, Jtil P2d 721 {)96)). State VI. Wood 
2 Utah 2d 34, 268 P2d 99ij (ljS4). The 
habitual criminal statute doea not inflict 
additional or further punishment for the 
prior conviction or impoee a new punish· 
ment therefor. It only aerves to tnvoke 
a more severe punish.inent for the last of 
subsequent of tense which might be imposed 
6 
because of the previous c:onv ic t tons. 
24B CJS sec 1953. Based upon thf s pro-
position the habitual criminal stetute 
f n other states has been sustained as 
against the attack for vfolattng the 
double jeopardy concept. Sec. 58 ALR 
23, 82 ALR 348, 116 ALR 212. 
A typical statement by the courts 
ts found in Ke11ey va. State (1933) 204 
Ind. 512, 185 NE 453 wherein the court 
said: 
11The statute does not tmpose an 
•ddittonel penalty on crtme1 for 
~1ch the defendant has alreedy 
been convicted. lt simply tm-
poses a heavter penalty for the 
conrnf aston of a felonv. The 
punishment is for the ne~ crhna 
"9n1y.0 
~ince there is no separate erim of 
being a habitual c;fmtna1, there can be 
no separate sentence under the habtt._.1 
crtmfnal law. The lower court, tn the 
7 
instant case, sentenced the defendant 
on two separate offenses, t.e., on the 
second degree b~rgl•ry statute end on the 
habitual crtmfnaJ law. Consequently, 
the lower court f ~nored the nature and 
purpose of the habitual st•tute and, fn 
fact, did not enhance the puntshment of 
the thf rd aubstantfve offense, but rather 
inf Jicted punishment twfce for the same 
·offense. By sentencing the defendant 
on two separate c::harges, to ~un eonsec-
ut i vel y, the defendant was befng punfshed 
not only for the burglary charge, but 
also for befng a habitual crtmfnel, which 
included as a Clondttfon, the ftndfng 
g._,11ty on the tt~frd subst•ntfve burglary 
offense charge. ~son vs. Harrf 1, 106 
Utah 32, 144 P2d 761 (1944). The end 
result of the lower court•s sentencfng 
procedure would be that the defendant 
would be forced to serve the aentence 
on the burglary cherge and after the 
termination or conl'nutatton of thet 
charge, he would serve the naw sentence 
under the habitual criminal charge. 
It seems evident that the 1C*er C0'8't 
considered thet two aeperate offenaes 
had been conmitted when tt not only 
inf Hcted two separate sentences, but 
ruled that the aentence1 were 'o nm 
consecuttvely (K•3). Moreover, it -.ould 
appear that the lower co~rt had in mind 
UCA 76-1-33 as amended (195~) which prQ-
vides for consecutfve sentences where 
a peraon has been convtc:ted of two or 
more crimes and sentences had been pro-
nounced on one at the lower court sentenced 
the defendant in the inat•nce case. McCoy 
vs. $everson u , 222 P2d 
i 056 ( l J!JJ). In so tX> i ng, the tri a 1 court 
violated the double jeopardy clause of the 
state and federal constitutions. The 
sonstitutional provision is broad enough to 
mean that no one can lawfully be punished 
twice for the same offense and is designed 
to protect the accused from double punish-
ment as m"'ch as to protect him from two 
trials. 248 CJS sec. 1990 (a). Moreover, 
a c~rsory examination of the Utah cases 
indicate that the proper proc;edure ta 
i 111pos i ti on of one sentence. See Thompson 
vs. Harrts, 107 Utah ~9. 152 P2d 91, (1943). 
reh~ring denied 106 Utah 32, 144 P2d 761, 
( 1J4Lt). State vs. wood, Supra 
In the alternative, ft is respectfully 
s~bmitted that the sentence on the habttuel 
chc3r~e i5 votd •nd without effect. In the 
case or: Ex parte Walt 73 :.i.D. 4J6, 44 N.w. 
10 
2d 119, ( 1950) the lower court sentenced 
the defendant on the count one for ;rand 
larceny, count two for burglary end upon 
the tnformation charging ht• es bed.ng a 
hebltual crimtnal to 11fe fmprfacnnent. 
The eppeel court held that the lC*W court 
had exhausted hts power and jurfadtctton 
to pass any further sentence en the d9fend-
ant by stating that the lowr COLlt had 
attempted to pass a third sentence upon 
the pattttoner. not to •ugment the punt1h-
ment for the crime. of betnQ "a hebtt~I 
criminal... There being no such cirtme, the 
court held that the sentence att.-pted to 
be passed upon wa5 beyond the jurtsdtctton 
ot' the trial court and void. To the •-
at feet, Gameron v1. Jonea 148 ,.eb 6~5 28 
N.w. 2d 403, ( 1JL+7) where the separate 
1 1 
sentence was rw1ed void. 
Generally. the majorfty rule tn such 
cases states that on a convfctton under 
an indictment alleging prior cxanv1ct1ons 
there c:an be btJt one ji,,dgment or sentence 
imposed. sec. 248 CJS sec 1'71 (a). An 
illustration case ta found fn State vs. 
Kins, 140 P2d 283, 18 wash 2d (194)), where-
in teh Washington court auamartzed the 
Washington cases with regard to sentenctng 
as fol lows: 
urhe c:a1e then ho 1 d ( 1) that t f, 
contrary to the prescrtbed pro-
cedure, sentence ts 1mpoaedf6'r 
st.1bs tant ive offense whf ch thi 
habttual criminal proeeedtng 11 
stf 11 pending and undetermfned, 
the judgment tmpostng such sent-
ence is premature and beyond the 
power or t he ~our t to enter; and 
hirther, ( 2) that ff the sentence 
is imposed solely upon the habitual 
charge, such sentence also is vo1d. 
and the defendant shoudl then be 
resenteneed as for the first ttme, 
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upon the latest substantive 
offense, taken f n connection 
with the habitual <:rimtnal 
adj udtcat ton; but ( 3) thl t ff 
found sentence be once imposed 
upon the defendant for the sub-
stantive offense prior to the 
1nstf tutton of a habf tue1 crtm-
ina 1 procedure, audl defendant 
is subsequent1y adjudged to be 
a habitual crtminel, he cannot 
thereafter be agatn sentenced 
for the original aubstanttve 
crtme taken 1n correction wf ht 
tho 1ub1equent adjudication of 
his habitual crimlnal status." 
This same court stated that the 
correct procedure would be to after the 
adj udicatfon of the habitual ertmfnal 
matter to sentence the defendant for the 
COll'Dfasfon of the substantive crime, wf th 
the increase penalty exacted because of 
the adjudication of the defendant'• hab-
ttual criminal status. 
The appellant respectfu11y submttl 
that the action of the 1ow.r court tn 
13 
imposing separate sentences on tM thtrd 
substantive offense end on the haabttual 
matter to run concurrently, if permitted 
to stand, vtolates the double Jeopardy 
provtstons of the state and Federal 
constttutton. In the a1tern11ttve, the 
appellant suggests that tha sentence on 
the substantive chars• i1 va1fd and tt. 
other sentence ts void, consequently, the 
appellant'• req~at that the sentence on 
the habf tua1 criminal charge be v.ated 
as being void or that tho e411e be remanded 
for proper sentencing tn 1fght of the P'-'• 
pose of the hatbtu.1 criminal atatut:• and 
in conformity tQ the poattion a.1rged by the 
appe11ant. 
Respectfully 1ut.ettted, 
Jtmt Htt1una9e 
Legal Defender 
Attorney f• .,._11ant 
